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International Law from a Machiavellian Perspective, by Anthony D'Amato, pp.82-95, in
The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations, ed. by W. David Clinton,
(Political Traditions in Foreign Policy series), Louisiana State University Press, 2007
Abstract: Machiavelli leaves one with both an optimistic and a pessimistic prognostication for the post-Cold War
world. On the one hand, the end of that conflict has opened the way for the spread of liberal, constitutional
regimes, which he would say are inclined to be more and more meticulous in honoring their commitments. On the
other, the temptation to use force to create new facts and thereby force international law into new paths will remain
as long as politics is practiced. The contemporary relevance of Machiavelli may be seen in that he urged both
realities upon us. I focus on a single incident that postdated the end of the Cold War—the show of force by the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996.
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[pg82]* There are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper
to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to
the second.
MACHIAVELLI, The Prince, XVIII

The purpose of this essay is to view international law in light of Machiavelli's teachings
on politics. I focus on a single incident that postdated the end of the Cold War—the show of
force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996. The
disadvantage of writing about events that have relatively recently transpired is that some
relevant information is unavailable because it has not been made public. However, there is also
an advantage: there is less danger of rationalization. For example, if ten years from now a
scholar looking at state archive materials on the Taiwan Strait incident of1996 finds numerous
memos on the international law aspects of the problem, the scholar may be led to believe that
concerns about international law played a large role. Yet the paper trail may unduly magnify
itself in historical contemplation; unrecorded conversations in soundproof rooms may have
played a larger role in policy decisions. Machiavelli himself did not hesitate to use recent
events interchangeably with historical materials to provide illustrations for his ideas.
Although he rarely discussed international law,FN1 Machiavelli's work illuminates the
present-day study of international law because of what he had to say about power. One aspect
of the complex relation between law and powerFN2 is that law can be an extension and
implementation of a ruler's power. An autocratic prince will find that imposing law and order
on his subjects simply increases his own wealth and freedom of action and hence is a useful
tool in his arsenal of power. The law that he imposes upon his subjects does not apply to
himself; he is free to disregard it. Similarly, [pg83] those who are skeptical about international
law often say that powerful nations use international law to impose their will upon smaller
nations, while disregarding that same law when it in their national interest to do so. The
problem with this aspect of the relation between law and power is that it is simple and trivial
and only applies, if at all, in extreme cases, when all the chips are down. Machiavelli, the
realist, knew that, when the chips were down, an autocratic prince would use his power to
trump whatever legal rules were in place. And indeed, bullets will always win over words; it is
futile to expect law to restrain activities when all the chips are down. To kill someone in selfdefense who is about to murder you is regarded in all countries as an exception to the law
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against murder, not because the law says so (many early statutes making murder a criminal act
did not mention self-defense) but because it would be futile for the law to attempt to restrain a
person who must kill in order to avoid being killed. Machiavelli acknowledged that in a serious
emergency it may be necessary to break the law. But breaking the law carries a price: "it
establishes a custom of breaking laws for good purposes; later, with this example, they are
broken for bad purposes."FN3
Although extreme cases are important, most of the time the cases are ordinary.
Moreover, the more law there is, the fewer will be the occasions where cases are regarded as
extreme. The more rules there are (or seem to be) in international relations, (1) the more states
will interpret their own interests in light of those rules and (2) the more states will regard those
rules as dispute-settlement mechanisms. As an example of (1), suppose that the international
rule of freedom of the seas did not exist. Coastal states would then regard it as essential to their
national interest to grab as much of the high seas as possible and militarily enforce it against
predators from all the other nations. Instead, the rule of freedom of the seas simply removes
from the active consciousness of government officials any desire to use power to engage in
obtaining and securing sovereignty over the high seas. The rule simply removes an array of
potential crises from consideration. As an example of (2), legal rules perform a natural function
of being invoked by disputing parties in an effort to get their own positions accepted by the
other side. If there is a set of relevant rules of international law out there to be invoked,
governments will nearly always find it cheaper to invoke those rules in support of their own
positions than to use military force; lawyers are cheaper than armies. Once lawyers from both
sides get together to haggle over rules, crises tend to get defused, and a certain amount of giveand-take and minor accommodations begins to look [pg84] desirable to both sides. I am not
talking here about international courts as dispute-resolving mechanisms, even though such
courts naturally reinforce the perception that disputes can be resolved peacefully. International
law works in the absence of courts in the hundreds of minor international disagreements that are
the daily stuff of foreign offices and embassies, with which Machiavelli, having himself served
as an envoy, was certainly familiar. And even in major disputes, the availability of an
apparently neutral set of rules is an almost irresistible invitation to try to accomplish one's goals
by invoking and citing those rules.
Both (1) and (2) work together to produce a kind of increasing momentum. The more
international law is given credit for defusing tensions or serving as a reference point for the
resolution of conflicts, the better it will accomplish both of these tasks in the future. Perhaps a
better way to make this point is that law works as a long-term phenomenon. This is due to two
main factors. First, law operates reciprocally: although state S may lose today to state T because
of rule X, S may win tomorrow against state U citing the same rule, and a year from now its
position might change so that rule X now operates in S's favor against state T. Second, the
entire system of law may be perceived to work in a powerful state's favor over time, despite the
fact that not all of its rules are welcome. For example, the United States has changed its
position on the Law of the Sea Treaty. During the Reagan administration, the United States
refused to sign the treaty because of just a few provisions in the treaty—those that relate to
ocean floor mining. The Clinton administration, while still viewing those rules as distasteful,
simply concluded that you can't win them all and that most of the provisions in the Law of the
Sea Treaty were sufficiently valuable to the United States as to outweigh the costs associated
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with accepting the rules on deep sea mining. A contributing factor was the later assessment that
the Reagan administration's evaluation of the potential profits of deep sea mining was overly
optimistic. What is true of treaties is even truer of customary international law as a whole. If a
powerful country flouts the system and acquires an outlaw status in the eyes of other countries,
it risks losing more than it gains, especially since some of the risks are indeterminate (because
customary law is itself to some extent indeterminate and continuously in the process of
revision). Hence, over the longer term, the more powerful states begin to perceive that
international law as a whole works in their self-interest. If international law did not exist today,
I would be foolhardy in predicting that it would begin to arise tomorrow. But because it exists
today, has existed for many centuries, and is becoming increasingly dense [pg85] and finemeshed, there is not much risk in predicting that it will be more effective and important
tomorrow than it is today.
Even in Machiavelli's world where princes deposed other princes and mercenary armies
conquered city-states and even turned against the princes who hired them,FN4 he advised
founding princes to continue many of the old laws that people were accustomed to.FN5
Moreover, Machiavelli never said that princes were above the law; rather, they had the power to
violate the law, but they often had to pay a price for doing so. He gave the example of
Savonarola, who got a law passed and then did not observe it; his conduct "took influence away
from him and brought him much censure," and added, “I do not think there is a thing that sets a
worse example in a republic than to make a law and not keep it, and so much the more when it
is not kept by him who has made it."FN6 International law is made by the statesFN7 and
hence, to the extent that a powerful state has made a lot of it, that same state is perhaps all the
more restrained from breaking the law for the reason that Machiavelli gave in his example of
Savonarola.
The idea that law works best in the long run can be found in Machiavelli's observation
about governments: "Governments by princes have lasted long, republican governments have
lasted long, and both of them have needed to be regulated by the laws."FN8 This situation can
obtain only when the prince himself obeys the laws: "when the people see that under no
circumstances will he [the prince] break those laws, in a short time they feel secure and
contented. An example is the kingdom of France, which lives safely for no other reason than
that those kings are restrained by countless laws in which is included the security of all her
people."FN9
Once a prince comes to realize that social control is a function of obeying the law, his
mind may begin to rule out any base desires to break the law. He realizes, as Machiavelli
implied, that the more he obeys the law the greater his personal power becomes. An orderly
society that obeys the law is the ultimate portrait of the prince's personal power. Yet there
seems to be a blind spot in Machiavelli's discussion of the Roman emperors: FN10 he does not
perceive that some of them may have gotten high by arbitrarily violating the law. An emperor
may lead the public to expect regularity through law, and then suddenly break the law himself
in a situation that has absolutely no social utility—in fact, its consequences are deliberately
harmful, and the shock and disbelief experienced by the public at the emperor's act is precisely
what gives him his euphoric feeling of total power. It is possible that Saddam Hussein's
decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 was this kind of deliberately shocking act driven by power3

lust, for it is hard otherwise [pg86] to account for the folly of his decision. However, as we
move away from princes and move toward republics—as nations are increasingly run by
parliaments, groups, and committees—the chance of arbitrary breaches of international law
may diminish. Individual power-lust can be filtered out in tedious committee meetings. In
international law we are seeing occasional moves and feints toward war as if to remind one's
antagonists that resorting to international force is not an entirely forgotten idea. Indeed,
tweaking the rules of international law can sometimes be an advantage in international power
confrontations, as we will see in considering the events of March 1996 off the China coast.
The United States in 1996 was the number one military power in the world; by most
estimations, China was number two. Although Taiwan had considerable defense capability, it
was not a formidable military power. Yet Taiwan was a strong economic trading partner with
the United States (and with the People's Republic of China [PRC]), and had a democratic
government that the United States had an interest in preserving. Although the States in 1979
had terminated its Mutual Defense TreatyFN11 with Taiwan and had gradually withdrawn its
soldiers who were stationed on that island, it continued its policy of arms transfers to Taiwan.
Perhaps U.S. military strategists perceived that arming Taiwanese was more effective in
discouraging aggressive impulses by the PRC than leaving U.S. troops on the island as a tripwire. After all, a future U.S. administration might withdraw the troops; perhaps, even in the
course of a Chinese invasion, the American public would not tolerate the loss of American
soldiers defending the Taiwanese, and would want them brought home. Moreover, military selfdefense has a huge battlefield advantage. If the PRC were to send fleets of soldiers across the
Taiwan Strait, under standard military theory it would need at least twenty attacking personnel
for every Taiwanese defender. In addition, the preparations for any such attack from the
mainland would be visible months in advance, giving the United States and other countries
ample opportunity to come to the rescue of Taiwan. The 1992 sale to Taiwan of 150 F-16
advanced jet fighters was dramatic corroboration of this aspect of U.S. policy. The PRC
repeatedly and bitterly denounced U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, but could do nothing about
them.
By February 13, 1996, there were some Chinese military maneuvers from inland toward
the Chinese coast opposite Taiwan. At a White House press briefing, the following exchange
took place: [pg87]
Q: Has China been given an ambiguous answer on what we would do if it did attack Taiwan?
PRESS SECRETARY MIKE MCCURRY: Oh, I doubt very much, given the PRC's
understanding of the Taiwan Relations Act, FN12 that they have much doubt.
Q: I thought you said earlier that we were being deliberately ambiguous.
MR. MCCURRY: Well, we've not—we've never specified the exact response consistent with
the exact wording of the Taiwan Relations Act. But if you look at that act, if you look at the
requirement for peaceful resolution of issues related to the Straits, it's quite clear what the view
of the international community would be of any unnecessary provocation.
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Q: What would that be?
MR. MCCURRY: It's very clearly specified in the Taiwan Relations Act.
Q: Which is?
MR. MCCURRY: Which I don't have in front of me.FN13
One may note a theoretical equivalence between a government spokesperson's statements "our
policy is ambiguous" and "our policy is clear but I don't know what it is." The important point
is that the United States was not willing to reveal any of its military contingency plans in
advance of China's intentions becoming clearer; the rest is the usual diplomatic double-talk.
A month later, the U.S. government, through its spokesperson, opted in favor of directly
labeling its policy as ambiguous:
Q: Do you think the United States would be bound by the 1979 Act to defend Taiwan against
Chinese aggression?
MR. MCCURRY: The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act does not answer that question specifically
and, indeed, there is merit we believe in keeping somewhat ambiguous about the matter.FN14
Various motives have been ascribed to the PRC for amassing its military forces in the Taiwan
Straits. The American media reported that China was trying to influence the upcoming
Taiwanese presidential elections on March 25, and that China was concerned about the example
on the Chinese people of Taiwan's open and democratic elections. Neither of these alleged
motives is particularly credible. It seems instead that China was making a statement during the
Taiwan election campaign that no matter who was elected, the government should cease its
foreign activities seeking [pg88] to obtain an international personality for Taiwan. I cite as
evidence for this proposition a report by CNN on March 12 that the PRC offered to withdraw
its military forces from the Taiwan Strait if Taiwan withdrew its overseas campaign for entry
into the United Nations—an offer that Taiwan promptly rejected.FN15
By March 5, the PRC had announced that it was going to conduct war games, including
missile exercises in the Taiwan Straits. The U.S. reaction, given at a White House press
briefing, was restrained:
MR. MCCURRY: We have long felt that military exercises of that nature, specifically these
types of missile tests, don’t do anything to contribute to peace and stability in the region.FN16
Two days later, the press secretary (1) refrained from admitting that there had been tests and
(2) that the PRC had announced missile tests, and (3) characterized them in more forceful
language:
MR. MCCURRY: If, indeed, there have been missile tests associated with military exercises
that are underway now adjacent to the Taiwan Straits, they would be consistent with what the
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People's Republic had previously announced. They've previously announced they would likely
include as part of this exercise missile tests. We would be deeply disturbed by any test of that
nature, consider that provocative, and consider them reckless.FN17
The United States was speaking from a position of having monitored the Chinese troop
movements. It came to the conclusion that the deployment of force in the Taiwan Strait did not
have the characteristics of a preparation for invasion of Taiwan. Thus there was practically no
chance that China intended to start a war with Taiwan. Moreover, intentional aggression against
Taiwan would be irrational from the Chinese perspective (although, with Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait freshly in mind, one should never rule out the capacity of dictatorial leaders
to commence a wholly irrational war). A war against Taiwan would be irrational, first, because
several thousand American citizens were present in Taiwan (a number of them working in the
quasi-diplomatic American Institute in Taiwan set up by the Taiwan Relations Act). Chinese
aggression against Taiwan would undoubtedly trigger a huge American military response if for
no other reason than to protect the lives of American citizens on Taiwan. Second, China
continued to count on the support of many Taiwanese residents who were loyal to the PRC. An
invasion that would be [pg89] preceded by artillery and missile fire would not be able to
distinguish between these compatriots and other Taiwanese citizens, and thus would endanger
everyone. In recognition of this problem, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang was
quoted on Chinese state radio as saying. "China has never promised to give up the use of force,
though of course this is not directed at the Taiwan compatriots."FN18 How can artillery and
missile fire spare those compatriots in crowded proximity with other Taiwanese citizens? War
is simply too blunt an instrument these days compared with the city-states of Machiavelli’s
time. Bombarding Taiwan would have the effect of immediately turning the compatriots against
China. Finally, Taiwan had a substantial defense capability. Despite China's overwhelming
troop strength (over 3 million soldiers), its meager amphibious capability would give Taiwan's
beach perimeter defense an almost insuperable advantage.
Yet military hostilities can arise from mistakes and accidents, which is probably one
reason Secretary McCurry used the words provocative and reckless. In the war of words that
was going on, the PRC responded within five days that the U.S. policy was "stupid and
reckless.”FN19 I will now try to show that the fear of error escalating into war was the linchpin
in the confrontation between the PRC and the United States in March 1996.
The Chinese war games in the Taiwan Strait began on March 11. More than 150,000
Chinese troops were involved in the live ammunition exercise, as were a flotilla of ships and at
least three hundred airplanes.FN20 The United States responded by deploying significant naval
forces to international waters several hundred miles east and southeast of Taiwan, and not in the
Taiwan Strait. Included was the USS Independence, a carrier group out of Yokosuka, Japan,
that included several cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and nuclear attack submarines. A second
carrier group, the USS Nimitz was sent from the Persian Gulf to international waters southeast
of Taiwan.F21 The U.S. Navy did not conduct live ammunition war games, but engaged in
noticeable twenty-four-hour-a-day exercises, including eighty sorties daily from the USS
Independence.
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Rear Admiral James Ellis, commander of the Seventh Fleet Battle Force, told CNN
news: "What is our purpose here, and it is not to bully or intimidate. We are here to monitor the
ongoing military exercises. The Chinese themselves have said that's a normal naval function.
That’s what they do with us, that's what we do with them.”FN22 It is a classic case of creating
an ambiguity between words and actions. The United States did not need two huge carrier fleets
to "monitor" the Chinese games; that was [pg90] already being done by reconnaissance
satellites, and in any event the fleets were too far away to see or hear anything with the games.
However, the PRC, for its part, understood full well that the United States was downplaying its
naval presence near Taiwan, and rather than contradicting the U.S. characterization, instead
chose to downplay it even further. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was asked by a reporter on
Beijing television to react to the American plans to move its carrier forces close to Taiwan. The
minister replied, "It is common for U.S. warships to engage in activities in high seas."FN23
Earlier, in January 1996, Defense Minister Chiang Chung-ling had downplayed the matter
perhaps to lowest possible level of discourse. Commenting on a rumor about a planned
carrier traversal of the Taiwan Strait during the Taiwan elections in March, the minister said
that he had not heard anything about it: "A minister will not necessarily know every trifling
matter such as this. He is in charge of major affairs."FN24
In order to analyze these military and diplomatic posturings fully, they must be seen as
interacting with rules of customary international law. One of those rules is that because the
Taiwan is approximately 100 miles wide (and 137 miles long), it is an international waterway.
Therefore, it is legally open to vessels of all nations. The Chinese military exercises effectively
cut off that waterway, thus temporarily violating international law. Yet I believe it was part of
the deliberate Chinese military strategy to violate international law. When any nation uses its
military forces in violation of international legal norms, the intimidation factor increases. The
target of the intimidation—namely, the Taiwanese people—would be uncertain whether the
PRC might proceed to violate other international norms, such as the norm against aggression.
But this violation of international waters also presented a legal and military challenge to
the United States. In December 1995 the USS Nimitz had traversed the Taiwan Strait. Would
the U.S. Navy try it again in March 1996, when China was conducting live ammunition and
missile tests in those waters? To do so would be to present a frontal challenge to the PRC:
either back down, or continue the tests with the high probability of hitting the USS
Independence and setting off a war with the United States. Prior to the tests China had issued a
warning to international shipping and aviation to stay away from the Taiwan Strait. The PRC
chose its language carefully on March 17, when it was still doubtful whether the U.S. Navy
would try to navigate the Taiwan Strait. Prime Minister Li Peng said: "If someone makes a
show of force in the Taiwan Strait, that not only be a futile [pg91] act, but it will also make the
situation all the more complicated."FN25 The U.S. response was to play down the situation. A
“White House official" said in Washington: "Although we don't like the newly announced
military exercise, we take note of the fact that there is little to no interference with international
shipping or air travel, that they take place far from Taiwan proper so that there is no direct
threat, and that the Chinese have been careful in their rhetoric not to issue direct threats."FN26
In fact, the United States did not try to navigate the Taiwan Strait, and China brought its war
games to an end two days after the presidential election on Taiwan. The entire affair ended
peacefully.
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Allow me to speculate on the reasons behind the U.S. decision not to send either or both
of its carrier fleets through the Taiwan Strait. First, though the United States branded the
Chinese war games as "reckless," it had conducted and undoubtedly will continue to conduct
similar naval war games of its own, especially in the Persian Gulf and in the Mediterranean (in
order to intimidate states like Iraq, Iran, and Libya.) Any objection to the Chinese war games
could come back to haunt the United States the next time it wishes to conduct similar exercises.
Second, the United States set the precedent for cordoning off a portion of the high seas
when it conducted its nuclear tests in the South Pacific in 1954. At that time it notified
international shipping and aviation to stay away from the specified area. However, the
magnitude of one of the test explosions was underestimated by half, and there was in addition
an erroneous wind prediction. A Japanese fishing vessel, which apparently lay fourteen miles
clear of the warning zone, was caught in the radiation; its twenty-seven-man crew suffered
serious injuries, one of them dying. The United States paid Japan $2 million for the injuries to
the crewmen and the damage to the Japanese fishing industry.FN27 Japan explicitly refused to
demand that the United States discontinue its tests.FN28
These facts appear to establish that when the international legal norm of freedom of the
seas is temporarily violated for the purpose of conducting weapons tests, the norm should be
interpreted as a ‘liability’ rather than a "property" norm.FN29 Under this interpretation, if the
USS Independence were to have entered the proclaimed war games zone in the Taiwan
Strait) and if it had been hit by Chinese artillery fire or a missile, China could restored the
situation to the status quo ante by promptly offering to pay full damages to the United
However, this legal result would have been extraordinarily difficult for President Clinton to
explain to the American people. There would have been cries in Congress to [pg92] retaliate
with full force against China and the president would have been criticized as a weakling for
accepting payment from China for the affront to the U.S. Navy. Thus, assuming that lawyers for
the Pentagon and the State Department reasoned the matter through to this point, they might
very well have advised the president that it was politically a no-win situation to send an carrier
force through the Taiwan Strait.
The preceding two reasons have to do with the relation between rules of customary
international law and military strategy. A third reason bears on the relation between political
prediction and military strategy. White House political advisers may have come to the
conclusion that the PRC made a political miscalculation in deciding to conduct military
exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC may have acted out of a sense of frustration that
Taiwan was gradually heading toward independence from the mainland; not knowing exactly
what to do about it, China may have simply decided to flex its military muscles—a decision
that may have had more to do with the fact that the leadership was aging and nearly senile than
with any sound political calculation.
But the predictable consequences of a military show of force in the Taiwan Strait would
be to drive the Chinese compatriots on Taiwan closer to the rest of the Taiwanese citizenry, for
reasons I have suggested earlier in this essay. Hence it would not be surprising to see in the
months that followed an acceleration in the overseas activities of Taiwanese officials in the
8

direction of independent statehood for Taiwan, stimulated by the Chinese demonstration in the
Taiwan Strait in March 1996 (as, indeed, there has been in the years since 1996). If the White
House made a similar assessment, then its best strategy would have been to bring the USS
Nimitz and the Independence into the area—so as to show support for the people on Taiwan—
and at the same time let China go ahead with its war games with only mild remonstrance from
the White House press secretary. If I am correct about White House strategy, it would simply
be the latest example of an ambiguous and hence remarkably flexible policy that served the
United States well through the years in preserving peace in the region of the Taiwan Strait and
allowing the Two China Problem to work itself out at its own pace. In reading Machiavelli, one
finds numerous examples of political miscalculation by princes and other rulers. One can be
impressed by the subtlety and skill of Chinese diplomats and government spokespersons in the
incident of the Taiwan Strait, and yet come to the conclusion that they may have simply been
putting the best possible face on a mental decision that was ill-conceived and counterproductive.
[pg93] Nevertheless, Machiavelli would appreciate the uses to which China could put its
perceived willingness to challenge international law in pursuit of political advantage. To be
feared by the Taiwanese government could carry more benefits than to be loved even by the
PRC compatriots in Taiwan. And to induce a certain caution in the actions of the world's
premier superpower demonstrated leverage that Beijing might find useful in some future
confrontation.
Moreover, an act of (even symbolic) force that contravenes international law may—
particularly if it is repeated—create a new state of affairs to which international law eventually
will accommodate itself. Machiavelli recognized that an "external cause," such as a military
defeat, may bring about "necessary change” in the laws of a state, a process that he
distinguished from change brought about "by its own intrinsic good sense.”FN30 International
law may be even more subject to alteration not through appeals to reason but through the
creation of a new status quo by means of power. Machiavelli did not advocate the use of force
to establish an altered power relationship "for though [external force] be the best remedy [for
the degeneration of laws] it is so dangerous that in no case is it what one should desire."FN3l
Still, when corruption has set in (and China has indicated that certain aspects of international1aw, such as the "unequal treaties" imposed on it in the nineteenth century, are tainted
with injustice or corruption), "normal methods will not suffice ... Hence it is necessary to resort
to extraordinary methods, such as the use of force and an appeal to arms."FN32 Frequent
renovations are beneficial if they lead institutions "back to their start"—that is, back to their
initial uncorrupted state. If removing any international legal barrier to China's ability to act as it
pleased in the straits between the mainland and its "province" was viewed in Beijing as a
cleansing of corrupt institutions and if "men never do good unless necessity drives them to it,"
then China's leaders could have reasoned in a Machiavellian way if they determined to risk the
hazardous use of force.FN33
Machiavelli leaves one, then, with both an optimistic and a pessimistic prognostication
for the post-Cold War world. On the one hand, the end of that conflict has opened the way for
the spread of liberal, constitutional regimes, which he would say are inclined to be more
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and more meticulous in honoring their commitments.FN34 On the other, the temptation to use
force to create new facts and thereby force international law into new paths will remain as long
as politics is practiced. The contemporary relevance of Machiavelli may be seen in that he
urged both realities upon us.
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